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    December 15

    Making sense languages being presented at the LSA

     The 2007 meeting for the Linguistics Society of America is happening in early January down in Anahiem (http://www.lsadc.org/info/meet-annual.cfm). There are lots of fascinating topics, but of course some of them are impossible to understand if you're not already in the argot.

    I'm hoping to post a summary of jargon definitions, but for this post, I just want to go through some of the lesser known languages that are being talked about. Some pretty fun ones. (I've highlighted the African languages.)

    Karitiana

    There are fewer than 200 Karitianas down in the Amazonian basin on a reservation near the Madeira River in Brazil's Rondonia Province. "The Karitiana language is the last surviving language in the Arikem branch of the Tupi language family. The majority of the popualtion learn Karitiana as their first language and Portugese as a second language. Endogamy prevails among the Karitiana, and their documented family structure demonstrates that the entire group is essentially one family. A reserve has been established for the Karitiana by the Brazilian government." http://alfred.med.yale.edu/alfred/recordinfo.asp?condition=(populations.pop_name='Karitiana')

    Rotokas

    About 4,320 people in Papua New Guinea speak Rotokas (they live on mountain slopes, in coastal areas, in tropical forest). It's an East Papuan language that's Subject-Object-Verb. http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=roo

    Chemehuevi

    Chemehuevi is a Uto-Aztecan language of the Western Plateau. It is closely related to Southern Paiute and is considered by many linguists to be a dialect of Southern Paiute. http://www.native-languages.org/chemehuevi.htm

    Totonaco

    About 3,000 people in Mexico around Veracruz, I think. It's Subject-Verb-Object. http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=too

    Ket

    A language in Siberia also called Yenisei-Ostiak and Ostyganna qa'. There are probably 150 speakers left. "The Ket language is practically the only living representative of the Yenisei family. The last reliable fixation of its nearest relative Yug dates back to the 1970s. Other related languages – Pumpokol, Arin, Kot (Assan) – stopped being used in the 18-19th centuries. Specialists suppose that the Yenisei languages are related to the North-Caucasian and Sino-Tibetan languages." Here's a great website with sound clips: http://lingsib.unesco.ru/en/languages/ket.shtml.htm 

    Dagbani

    Also called Dagbamba or Dagomba, there are about 540,000 speakers in Ghana (where my sister Jill lives--see the link to read her blog). I have some Dagbani wordlists around here somewhere. I believe it's a Niger-Congo language. Subject-Verb-Object, btw. http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=dag

    Kagayanen

    25,000 speakers in the Philippines (it's an Austronesian language). If you know more, let me know or better yet, let everyone know here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kagayanen_language 

    Kuuku Ya'u

    An Australian language in Queensland, it's a Paman language. Maybe 100 speakers left? http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=kuy

    Assamese

    20 million people in India speak these Indo-European language (also called Ôxômiya). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assamese_language 

    Agaw

    Actually the presentation at the LSA will be on Proto-Agaw. Agaw is (was?) a Cushitic language from Ethiopia. Maybe fewer than 2,000 speakers of "Western Agaw"?

    Oshiwambo

    A Namibian language (it's Bantu). http://www.schoolnet.na/languages/teti/moshiwambo.html has some fun lessons for you.

    Lango

    There's a language called Lango in the Sudan (20,000 speakers) and one in Uganda (970,000 speakers). I'm told they aren't the same. Hm. The Lango in Uganda were persecuted by Idi Amin. Both languages are Nilo-Saharan, but that's one of those broad language families that's like saying bananas and Arctic terns are related. (I think this is true.)

    Skwxw?7mesh

    Ah, I think this means Squamish, which is a Salish language. Salish languages are fun (in the Pacific Northwest of the US and Canada) and I should really post my paper of benefactives. Check out the Rosetta Project for info: http://www.rosettaproject.org/archive/squ/detail-1/?b_start:int=2&page_view=image_view.

     

    December 03

    Lights, camera, memory!

    One of my classes this semester is "Language and Cognition" with Lera Boroditsky. Basically, we're asking what's called the Whorfian question--does language shape thought? If I grow up in a language without numbers, do I actually think differently than someone who grows up counting?
     
    Right now I'm started on a research paper about metaphors on the Internet. One of the things I'm searching for is an old cog sci idea about dealing with new situations and remembering old ones ("scripts and schemas"). Yesterday Gus asked me why I was so terrible about remembering to not put fuzzy things in the washer with non-fuzzy things and/or to not put queen sheets in the washer folded in a perfect square so that they don't get clean. He wondered how a reasonably smart fellow could be so immune to correcting these behaviors.
     
    Today, I came across a discussion of memory that sort of connects the research paper and the laundry talk.

    Framing a memory

    What interesting about memory loss is that having a framework for remembering events is essential to remembering them. As children we are learning everything anew. Names, words, places, objects, tastes, smells, sounds. They’re all new. As such, we have no convenient way of storing memories of each. This is one of the reasons, we think, that as adults we remember very little from before the age of 4 years old. That is, memory is very definitely aided by knowing what in a given memory is out of place. That is, a 2-year-old has no way of knowing that aunt Annie’s purple hair is probably fake. It’s just extra information. As adults, knowing that hair does not often come in such a nuclear shade of purple, makes that detail of of aunt Annie stand out in the memory of her.

    Framing a memory is essential to remembering it. We tend to filter out details that are normal. So recalling those details is harder. It’s hard to remember every item in your living room from when you were 10.

    ....

    Scripts and schemas

    By framing memories and looking for the details that make a memory unique we can recall better. The framing technique is sometimes called a “schema.” That is, the scene of my childhood living room is familiar as a template. I can remember the couch, the old stereo, the TV, the coffee table, the funky lamps, and the Gorman painting over the mantle. That’s the schema in which all of my memories for that room take place. I can look out the living room window and it’s the summer of ‘85 in Cleveland once again. Look at all those trees!

    What’s happening in these memories? Those can be templatized too. Typically it’s nighttime and we’re watching TV. It’s day time and I’m watching TV. It morning and I’m watching TV. That’s the “script.”

    When details from the place change and the events that take place in that place change, that’s where we can remember things more clearly. I can remember building a fort out of the couch cushions. I can remember “speed-skating” during the ‘80 Olympics by sliding in long, exaggerated strides on our living room hardwood floors. Not everyday schemas or everyday scripts - but long-term memories.

    Perhaps my template for laundry is tremendously basic (separate colors and whites; add soap; use the right temperature; get it over fast). The question still remains why I don't update the template. Scripts are hard to change? I don't want to devote the energy to something trivial? I like having my attention elsewhere? I think the consequences aren't that big of a deal?

    You can find more thoughts on memory at http://blog.dandelife.com/archives/461.

    October 13

    Talking about Desperately Seeking Susan - New York Times

     

    From an op-ed piece about Susan B. Anthony, some good quotes:

    Above all, the drillmaster of the suffrage movement had no patience when it came to dogma. She won few points for her free thinking but forged ahead all the same: “I distrust those people who know so well what God wants them to do, because I notice it always coincides with their own desires.” She cast her vote always for tolerance, acting from a simple conviction: “For a people is only as great, as free, as lofty, as advanced as its women are free, noble and progressive.”

    Desperately Seeking Susan - New York Times
    September 16

    More linguistics wars

    Today in the park, trying not to be distracted by the Christian blues band or the faith healer calling for someone in the audience with some sort of lung problem (he wasn't sure what--cancer? he just knew they were out there), I read Elizabeth Bates' "On the Nature and Nuture of Language", a good review of the nativist position (Chomsky's camp--there's a special organ in the brain that does language) and the emergentist position (heir of psychologist Jean Piaget).
    Piaget argued that logic and knowledge emerge...from successive interactions between sensorimotor activity and a structured world. A similar argument has been made to explain the emergence of grammars, which represent the class of possible solutions to the problem of mapping a rich set of meanings onto a limited speech channel, heavily constrainted by the limits of memory, perception and motor planning...something is innate in the human brain that makes language possible, but that 'something' may not be a special-purpose, domain-specific device that evolved for language and language alone. (3)
    (This emergenist position is connected to complex systems theory, connectionism, parallel distributed processing, neural networks. It's also called interactionism and constructivism.)
     
    Bates' paper is a pretty great start for thinking about debates in linguistics. She defines and walks through the various parts of phonetics, phonology, semantics, and pragmatics: "let us start by defining the different levels of the language system, and then go on to describe how each of these levels is procesed by normal adults, acquired by children, and represented in the brain" (3).
     
    That means she points out that it's more in the nativist tradition to keep phonetics and phonology separate (whereas emergenists tend to think that the generalizations of phonologists "will ultimately be explained entirely in physical and pscyhophysical terms" (3). The nativists also argue for the structural independence of semantics and grammar, while the emergenists approach is to see some intimate relationship "using a combination of lexical and propositional semantics to explain the various meanings that are cofified in the grammar" (4).
     
    (Bates' section on pragmatics gives some good definitions, but it's hard to sort out anything but that at this point in the field. As she points out, it is often called the wastebasket of linguistic theory (whenever your theory can't account for something, just say, "Oh, that's pragmatics." That said, pragmatics may just be a module, fed by phonetic, lexical, and grammatical systems, or it could be several modules (one for registering emotion, another for thinking about metaphor and irony, etc), or it could be outside the language module altogether. The emergenist position tends to be that pragmatics is the cause of linguistic structure itself (19).)
     
    In the later sections of the paper, she looks at a similar split in psycholinguistics between "modularists" and "interactionists". The modularists believe that lexical and grammatical processing are independent and handled by separate mental/neural mechanisms. Each module does something and then you integrate them after they're all done. The interactionists "see word recognition and grammtical analysis as two sides of a single complex process: Word recogntion is 'penetrated' by sentence-level information" (12). There's a good review of the history of this debate and where the research is currently pointing:
    [Cross-linguistic studies of languages with rich morphological marking, unlike English] show that grammatical context can have a significant effect on lexical access within the very short temporal windows that are usually associated with early and automatic priming effects that interest proponents of modularity. In other words, grammatical and lexical processes interact very early, in intricate patterns of the sort that we would expect if they are taking place within a single, unified system governed by common laws. (14)
    Bates' own conclusions put her in the emergenist camp, though she seems relatively even-handed. Her final section compares relying on a language organ in the brain to calling a giraffe's neck a "high-leaf-eating organ" (20).
    I believe that we will ultimately come to see our 'language organ' as the result of quantitative adjustments in neural mechanisms that exist in other mammals...Once it finally appeared on the planet, it is quite likely that language itself began to apply adaptive pressure to the organization of the human brain. (20)

    Bates died in 2003 after a year-long battle with pancreatic cancer. She was an internationally recognized authority in the science of how the brain is organized to process language. She helped found the UCSD department of cognitive science and worked with lots of different people from different disciplines on over 20 languages on four continents. From http://crl.ucsd.edu/bates/memorial/:

    Among the most lasting of Bates’ contributions was research showing the brain's tremendous flexibility or 'plasticity' in learning language, demonstrating that children with injury to the language areas could still develop normal language abilities. She also showed that separate characteristics of the world's different languages determine the way that the brain organizes this information and incorporates it during development, adulthood, and in cases of disease. Her work also demonstrated the profound and lasting links between language and evolutionarily more ancient non-linguistic skills.

     

    The Language War

    I've been reading Robin Lakoff's The Language War (I'm about a third of the way through it--go get it here). I don't know Lakoff well--I at in on a class of hers last winter and visited her office this spring. That's enough that I can hear her voice in my head as I move through the book. It's a wonderful voice, world-weary, unrelieved. Her emphasis in speaking is different than mine--it's a relief not to always have your own voice in your head.
     
    Lakoff's book is about who holds power and how they use language to keep or gain it. She's interested in how words like "liberal" become terms of abuse, how "politically correct" is really a cover for stopping newly emergent groups (blacks and women) from contending for a share of language rights. And most of all (where she believes most linguists will start questioning whether she's doing linguistics here), how narratives tell us how we're connected and who has power.
     
    I'm especially impressed by the history of linguistics that the introduction offers (it's a chapter called, "What I am doing here and how I am doing it").
     
    When I was talking to folks at Berkeley, I remember some of Lakoff's own colleagues saying, "Well, we're not really sure what Robin does. And we're not sure it is linguistics." Lakoff seems to be aware of that in this chapter as she defines where the field is, where it's come from, and how ill she fits into it. Nevertheless, she still gives what she hopes is a rich path for the field to pursue (one that is not particularly scientific).
     
    Here's the history she charts:
     
    1) Start of 20th century: off-shoot of anthropology (also "newish"). While people who had described indigenous languages up to this point had seen their disappearance as a good thing (they were primative), these new linguists saw them "as expressions of the complexity and variety of the human mind, and therefore not only worthy of study, but essential to study if we were to understand ourselves as a species" (3). This was especially urgent as folks figured out that many of America's indigenous cultures were nearing extinction.
     
    2) The 1950s: the Chomsky revolution, which showed you had to take meaning into account at least superficially (the earlier stuff was all word lists and sound inventories). Chomsky's approach promised that "language could be a window into the mind, a glimpse into the universality of language capacities, and hence a way of achieving a fundamental understanding of what it means to be human" (4).
     
    While this idea was catching on in the 1960s, a lot of universities were starting up or upgrading. Having a linguistics department was the thing to do and it was pretty cheap to get big name scholars and the grants they attracted.
     
    Now here's the part that I love:
    But as linguistics grew exponentially, we tended to ignore the fact that it was now made up of at least three very different kinds of people, who had entered linguistics with at least three very different assumptions--and therefore had diametrically opposite notions of what we ought to be doing, or even what this 'scientific study of language' we claimed to be doing was, what 'language' consisted of, and what 'science' included. There were still many who had been trained as social scientists, anthropologists interested in learning about languages other than the familiar Indo-European ones as a way of understanding cultures very different from their own...Others (like me) had been trained as humanists and our interests lay in the hermeneutic potential of [Chomsky's transformational generative grammar]. We wanted a way to determine, from their superficial form, what sentences 'really' meant at a deeper level, why people made the choices they made, and what these choices signified about ouselves. Still others entered the field from mathematics or formal logic. For them, language was above all a system whose properites could be formalized in equation-like rules...the field has yet to achieve a rapprochement among [these three types of uneasy bedfellows]. (4-5)
    3) The 1970s: sociolinguists start figuring out that one's own culture is pretty exotic. They start challenging Chomsky's idea that variants and performance errors are unimportant and should be weeded out. (Mainly by having linguists come up with sentences at their desks, not by looking at how people actually talk.)
     
    Across all of this is an enterprise to keep the field scientific. Yet Lakoff's path would ask things like, "How do we use language to avoid responsibility for ourselves and allocate it to others?" (See 7 for a list of questions she thinks are interesting.)
    Answers to these questions must start with close analysis of actual linguistic data and show how the specific forms speakers select have the precise effects they do on social, economic, or political reality. Analyzing the superficial linguistic form of a communication alone cannot explain why these particular words, in those specific combinations, operate to this exact effect on the minds of hearers; much less can it teach us how to be discriminating hearers and responsible creators of language. (7)
     
    Increasingly I think that the speaker does not necessarily encode a single meaning, and that the business of making sense with language is a collaborative and indeterminate business. (11)
    Lakoff is interested in how we are all part of multiple speech communities and we're always shifting around in these to make meaning.
     
    This necessarily introduces a lot of complexity and she wants to consider all the causes and effects that involve linguistic expression (pretty much everything, as she points out). "The scientific method is not the only way we can arrive at understanding" (9). She accuses existing linguists of sneaking interpretation in so that their findings have any significance to them. She believes that's going to introduce more corruption than acknowledging and developing interpretive strategies. She thinks it's self-evident that these strategies will always be "partial and provisional" but perhaps, just as Donald Winnicott talked about "good enough mothering", we could have "good enough linguistic analysis". Not wholly satisfying for those of us who want to Prove Definitively, but a pretty good place for those of us who come from the humanities and appreciate motives, ambiguities, and subtleties.
    September 14

    Putting time in motion

    Answer this question: 

    Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days.

    What day is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?

    This weekend I read a fun paper that ties in nicely with calendar/event UI design (attached).

    We often use metaphors in designing user experiences, and even when we don’t, users still come up with metaphors to understand the interface. The most fundamental question the paper raises is, “How are we able to think about things that we’ve never been able to see or touch?” Like time, for example.

    A bunch of different studies have shown that most of the time 50% of people asked the question above answer, “Monday” and 50% of people answer “Friday” (fwiw, I say Friday by default. But my partner thinks I’m crazy and has no question that the right answer is Monday).  

    Most people have strong intuitions about which answer to this question is correct. As will become clear in this paper, the question is indeed ambiguous and intuitions about the answers can change dramatically depending on context (though their feelings of certainty towards their answers generally remain intact).

    The answer generally depends on how people think about time—if they think of themselves as moving forward through time, then moving a meeting ‘forward’ is moving it further in their direction of motion (WàF). If they think of time as coming toward them, then ‘forward’ means putting the meeting on Monday.

    What the paper goes on to show, however, is that there are all sorts of things you can do to people to make them feel like they are moving forward physically—and when they are in that sort of context, they are much more likely to answer “Friday” than “Monday”.

    From past studies:

    • If subjects first imagine sitting in a chair while moving toward a specific point, they’ll answer “Friday”. If subjects first imagine pulling a chair attached to a rope, they’ll answer “Monday”.
    • If you ask people in an airport who are coming or going somewhere, they’ll answer “Friday” a lot more than “Monday”. If you ask people in the airport who are just there to pick someone up, the answers will still be split 50-50.
    • If you ask people in a long lunch line, the people at the front of the line (near their goal) will answer Friday. But people at the end are split 50-50.

    So it appears that thinking about spatial motion is what underlines thought about time. Thought about abstract things is built on mental representations of things people have experienced.

    But wait, there’s something more. We use motion verbs for some things that don’t even involve motion—this is called “fictive motion”, like The tattoo runs along his spine or The highway goes along the coast. Even though there is no observable physical motion, a lot of languages still use their motion verbs this way. Linguists estimate that the preponderance of languages in the world do use motion verbs to talk about time (Christmas is coming).

    There are lots of fun extras in this paper, but the core is that if you give someone a fictive motion sentence and then ask them about when the meeting is, people will answer “Friday” 70% of the time. If you give people similar sentences that don’t involve fictive motion (The tattoo is next to his spine, The highway is next to the coast) and then ask them about the rescheduled meeting, they’ll split 50-50. “Our results…indicate that thought about fictive motion does indeed influence the understanding of time.” This is a lot more startling than asking people while they travel since in reading these sentences they haven’t gone anywhere, yet their mind has nevertheless put things in motion.

    Matlock, T., Ramscar, M., & Boroditsky, L. (2003). The experiential basis of meaning. Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.

    September 08

    Those who...

    From Bertold Brecht:

    Those who take the meat from the table
    Teach contentment.
    Those for whom the taxes are destined
    Demand sacrifice.
    Those who eat their fill speak to the hungry
    Of wonderful times to come.
    Those who lead the country into the abyss
    Call ruling too difficult
    For ordinary men.

    September 04

    Folklore index

    If you're interested in all the motifs of the stories you love, check out Stith-Thompson's numbered list. You can boil every pokey little puppy wrist-watch, Gus!

    A poem for later on in the year

    Though I’ll admit that Kevin McFadden’s ‘Tone Deficit’ has some fun for linguists in Utah, the only good poem in this month’s issue of Poetry is Galway Kinnell’s ‘December 26’:

     

                A Tuesday, day of Tiw,

                god of war, dawns in darkness.

                The short holiday day of talking by the fire,

    floating on snowshoes among ancient

    self-pollarded maple trees,

    visiting, being visited, giving

    a rain gauge, receiving red socks,

    watching snow buntings nearly over

    their heads in snow stab at spirtled bits

    of sunflower seeds the chickadees

    hold with their feet to a bough

    and hack apart, scattering debris

    like sloppy butchers, is over.

    Irregular life begins. Telephone calls,

    Google searches, evasive letters,

    complicated arrangements, faxes,

    second thoughts, consultations,

    e-mails, solemnly given kisses.

    French moose

    A while back, Rich Rhodes told us about how when the Mikmak encountered cows, they named them 'French moose'. I like the image a lot. The Algonquins just called them by the word for 'buffalo'. Of course later on they forgot that and started calling real buffalo 'wild buffalo', which really is a little forgetful of them. They should've used the Mikmak.

    Ecology of the mind

    Last year Rich Rhodes mentioned an interesting fellow to us in a linguistics class that was primarily about describing and translating an endangered language of Mexico (Sayula Popoluca).
     
    Gregory Bateson (married to Margaret Mead for a while) did research on schizophrenia and animal communication, among other things. He published "Steps to an Ecology of the Mind", which had the premise that ideas compete for attention at a particular time (this is 'intellectual history'). He asked, "What is an instinct?" and made the point that there are gentleman's agreements about what we ask about and how far we go. Every attempt to put a cap on abstractness failed, so for example, in phonology, you just move away from abstractness and go somewhere else. Bateson's thesis challenges what constitutes the grounds of an explanation.

    Not my favorite extinct mammal, but close

    I'm still trying to find a picture of these weird antelope with antlers on their snouts (really!) but in the meantime, here's the big ole uintatherium. Which sounds like a nice addition to any home. (Oh, yeah, we were going to add a solarium, but we decided to get a uintatherium instead.)

    Poised, ready to strike

    One of the best things about visiting LA in days past was seeing Avital and Drew. Not quite so keen as that, but keen nevertheless, was their talking action figure of Steve Irwin, Crocodile Hunter. You press a button and he'd say "Crikey!" or "Poised, ready to strike" in that great Australian accent. We could talk or not talk about that for hours.
     
    I'm sad to read that Steve just died--from a stingray, no less, which are actually pretty hard to get killed by (people step on their long barbed tails all the time and get taken to the hospital, but folks rarely die). It looks like swimming on top of one, its barb pierced through Steve's ribcage and delivered venom right to the heart. Pretty sad stuff. Crikey.

    Snakes on the brain

    There was a fun op-ed piece in the NYTimes yesterday about why primates and people have such better vision than other animals. Lynne Isbell proposes: snakes.
     
    [M]onkeys with the sharpest eyesight tend to be those who live in greatest proximity to venomous snakes. About 60 million years ago, primates had branched into two groups: the Old World monkeys and apes (including us) and the lemurs of Madagascar. Around the same time, venomous — as opposed to constricting — snakes appeared in Africa and Asia. (Of all the predators of modern primates, snakes were the first to appear, about 100 million years ago.)

    The Old World monkeys then branched again about 35 million years ago, when some went to South America and became the New World monkeys. The Old World monkeys and apes were the ones most exposed to venomous snakes, and of the three major primate groups, the Old World monkeys and apes have the best vision.

    You might chalk this up to coincidence, but what if you learned that the Malagasy lemurs have the least complex visual systems of the primates, and that venomous snakes have never lived in Madagascar? New World monkeys, in the meantime, have been exposed to venomous snakes on and off and on again for the past 60 million years, and the quality of their eyesight is better than that of lemurs but more variable than that of Old World monkeys and apes.

     
    And even more fun (albeit a "torture your cousin" kind of fun):
     

    Consider the observations made nearly 100 years ago by the British scientists P. Chalmers Mitchell and R. I. Pocock, when they carried writhing snakes into a roomful of caged monkeys and lemurs. The lemurs were unperturbed, and the South American monkeys showed some fear. But the Old World monkeys “bolted panic-stricken, chattering loudly and retreating to their boxes or as high up as possible in the larger cages.” The baboons jumped back, and the chimpanzees began to scream, “all keeping their eyes fixed on the snakes.”

    August 05

    Why your blog isn't good enough to get noticed

     

    Wired quotes Opinionista (Melissa Lafsky) about why your blog isn't getting you a book deal:

    1. You aren't kamikaze enough to risk your career by revealing the soul-crushing absurdity of your job.
    2. You aren't sufficiently vain or presumptuous to declare yourself a hot twentysomething female (even if it's true).
    3. You lack a diagnosed sleep disorder, minor substance abuse problem, mercurial temperament, and/or innate desire to alienate loved ones.
    4. You're not ready to declare on the Internet what you really think about hte raging hypocrites nesting in your life.
    5. You have yet to explore the wonders of shameless self-promotion, groveling, and media whoring. Profiles in The New York Times don't always come free." (Wired, July 06, pg 30)


    July 27

    Ice cream on the way home from the gym

     
    I know I do this--go work out and then think, "Hey, now I can treat myself". Here is some thinking about why New Years Resolutions may actually get in your way. Your actions are going to be consistent with your goal if you're focused on the commitment to the goal but you're going to screw up if you focus on monitoring progress towards the goal.
     
    There is a degree of irony in this,” said Professor Dhar. “If you believe that you are making progress towards a goal it can lead you to make choices that move you farther away from actually attaining it.”

    According to the authors, focusing on perceived progress towards a goal frequently liberates an individual to pursue another, incompatible goal. For example, opening a new savings account can be enough to suggest that a goal of saving for the future is being actively pursued and, as a result, the saver may feel that spending money on indulgences is justified. However, if the individual focuses on the commitment implied by setting a goal, Dhar and Fishbach’s research shows that if the action taken reinforces goal commitment, then there is a higher likelihood of similar actions and less straying from the initial goal. 

     

    First think how generous you are. Now buy yourself a yacht.

     
    Turns out that if you give to charity or do community service, you're more willing to spend money on luxury items. Actually, it's better than that. If you just think about signing up for a soup line or sending money to Darfur, you're more willing to indulge yourself.
     
    Bad side: People who think about donating tend to be less generous when actually asked to donate a little while later. Better to get folks fresh, I guess.
     
    According to the study, this phenomenon called the “licensing effect” illustrates that by engaging in—or merely expressing a preference for—a virtuous behavior creates a positive self-concept that acts as a license to purchase a luxury or a more indulgent product. The boost in self-concept helps offset the pang of guilt and negative self-attributions consumers often feel when buying expensive or frivolous items. It becomes easier to justify the purchase of a luxury good after the performance of a charitable act.
     
     

    It'll make you go blind. Really.

    From the Psychonomic Bulletin & Review: graphic depictions of violence and sex can temporarily blind people.
     
    "[Subjects] were to view a sequence of several hundred pictures, each of which appeared for one-tenth of a second on a computer monitor, and pick out 'target' images of landscapes or buildings. Sprinkled through the series of emotionally neutral pictures were several that depicted emotionally disturbing sights, such as a knife pressed against a woman's neck or a gruesomely flayed hand. These images upset participants enough to momentarily blind them to the pictures immediately following: when a target image appeared within one-fifth of a second after a disturbing image, subjects' accuracy rates fell from 85 to 71 percent.
     
    "In an as yet unpublished study [the psychologists] substituted erotic pictures for disturbing ones. The result was the same." (From Trey Popp's "Fear, erotic, and temporary blindness" in Yale Alumni Magazine, Nov/Dec 2005, pg 28)
     
     
    You can find out more here (you are supposed to be able to take the test yourself, but I couldn't figure out where it was): http://exploration.vanderbilt.edu/news/news_rubberneck.htm.
     
    Also, for those psych majors at Yale and Vanderbilt, here are the researchers involved:
    • Steven Most, Marvin Chun, David Widders (Yale)
    • David Zald (Vanderbilt)
     

    Bad tendencies (don't read "Instinct" magazine)

    Someone got our roommate a subscription of Instinct magazine, which is the most tawdry awful homocentric rag I've seen in a lot time.
     
    The equivalent of the Dear Abby section included some dizzy guy whose new boyfriend had surprised him with a cruise the same weekend as his best friend's wedding. Which she he go to?
     
    Now cruises are expensive and new boyfriends are wonderful, but: Best. Friend. Wedding. It doesn't really matter that weddings aren't necessary fun even when they are our best friends', nor does it really matter that the bride and groom will hardly see you. The fact is that it's a meaningful institution and while you can probably excuse yourself from some weddings, certain ones are requisite.
     
    The awful advice columnist said to go on the cruise. He even made it a cheer for gay rights. Stupid. Insensitive. Irritating.
     
    Worst. Magazine. Ever.
     
    (I. Learned. This. Technique. From. Political. Bloggers.)
     
    I'm not giving you the website address because you shouldn't go there. I've attached a pic so you know what to avoid. The guys in it usually aren't all that hot, btw, so you won't be missing much.